ABSTRACT The absence of explicit reference to sport in the EU Treaties has allowed the Court and the Commission room to require sport to adjust to the standards required by EU law. Sporting federations typically assert a need for a wider zone of autonomy than the Court and Commission have been prepared to grant, but, unable to persuade the Member States that they deserve exemption from the application of the Treaty, sports bodies have increasingly been induced to develop strategies of coexistence with the EU. This article shows how they were able to exert influence in both the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent intergovernmental conference in order to secure recognition of sport's special characteristics within the Treaty, albeit in ambiguous form. Sports bodies engage with the EU precisely in order to minimise its impact. The relevant provisions of Treaty of Lisbon dealing with sport are examined to show that they leave open scope for future contestation about the interaction between EU law and policy and systems of sports governance.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) operates according to the principle of conferral found in
Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This means that it may act only in areas where its treaties so authorise. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 sport was not even mentioned in the Treaty. Nevertheless first the Court of Justice and subsequently the Commission have insisted that in so far as sport constitutes an economic activity it falls within the scope of the Treaty.
Accordingly the increasing financial clout of professional sport has brought with it increasing vulnerability to litigation driven by players, clubs and broadcasters. In so far as practices have been found incompatible with EU law significant change has been demanded within sport. So, famously, the Court's 1995 ruling in Bosman 1 required the abandonment of direct discrimination on the basis of nationality in club football and the adjustment of the player transfer system. Sport bodies have long resented the intervention of EU institutions, for it constitutes a curtailment of the cherished autonomy of sport (see Chappelet 2010: 11-20 and 33-37) . That autonomy is lost in so far as the EU treaties apply, and the consequence is the creation of two 'separate territories': a territory for sporting autonomy and a territory for legal intervention (Parrish 2003a : 3, Weatherill 2007 . Although both the Court and the Commission accept that sport is in some respects distinct from 'normal' industries they have typically taken a much narrower view of the special character of sport than that pressed upon them by sports federations, who typically criticise intervention as inadequately sensitive to the peculiar characteristics of sport (for example UEFA 2007). The contest, then, is over the extent to which the territory for sporting autonomy should be invaded by legal intervention.
Governing bodies in sport have enjoyed no success in persuading the Court or the Commission that sport is of no concern to the EU, though they have enjoyed some success in arguing that particular challenged practices are compatible with the Treaty.
This suggests that an approach based on acceptance in principle of the EU's proper involvement in sport combined with strategies to persuade its institutions that sporting practices are not incompatible with EU law might offer the most rational way forward.
Engaging with the EU in order to soften its intrusive effect was the principal strategy deployed directly and indirectly by sports organisations in the process of negotiation that led from the Convention on the Future of Europe to the Treaty of Lisbon, which has for the first time brought sport explicitly within the Treaties (see García 2007a) . It may seem a paradox that actors whose main aim is to shelter their territory from incursion by the EU should be willing to embrace explicit inclusion of their industry in the Treaty. This, however, is rational once one understands that the structure of the Treaty, and in particular its broad functionally-driven emphasis on building an internal market, asserts a textually uncontrolled competence to regulate many sectors which are not explicitly within its reach. Including sport in the text of the Treaty is an attempt to exercise control over the direction taken by the Court and the Commission.
This article explores the methods chosen by sport bodies and reveals that they have been able to exercise significant political leverage in recent negotiations, albeit that the ultimate prize, exemption from the Treaty, remains inaccessible.
The article analyses legal and policy documents and the empirical presentation is supported with information selected from a total of 45 semi-structured interviews with officials from EU institutions, national governments and sports organisations The article proceeds in four steps. First we review the origins of EU sports law and policy. Second, the article explores the efforts of the sporting movement to gain Treaty recognition at Amsterdam, Nice and in the Convention on the Future of Europe. Third, the article explores the negotiations that led to the inclusion of sport in the Treaty of Lisbon. Finally, we assess the consequences of the relevant provision,
Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the ambiguity of which promises further episodes in which sport bodies will seek to engage with the EU's institutions in order to persuade them to play a limited interventionist role.
THE CONTESTED GROWTH OF EU SPORTS LAW AND POLICY
In its first ever ruling on sport, Walrave and Koch, 2 the Court concluded that even though the Treaty did not mention sport, its practice fell within its scope in so far as it constitutes an economic activity. This landmark ruling set the scene for a potentially broad basis of review of sporting practices against the standards demanded by EU law. However, the fact that a matter falls within the scope of EU law does not necessarily mean it is incompatible with it. In Walrave and Koch the Court proceeded to consider the particular matter at hand, the limitation of national representative teams to nationals of a particular country. This, one might suppose, offended a foundational value of the Treaty, the prohibition against nationality-based discrimination. However, the Court added that such a rule 'does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest' (para. 8). There is therefore room for sport to show why it is different from normal industries: in this instance, nationality discrimination defines the very nature of the activity and consequently it escapes prohibition.
This legal model allows for a cohabitation of sporting regulations and EU law.
Despite debate about the nature of this so-called 'sporting exception' (see Parrish and Miettinen 2007) , its basic definition is relatively straightforward: Once it is demonstrated that a sporting practice exerts economic effects it falls within the scope of the Treaty. It then falls to the sports regulator to show a justification for the measure -and the justification may properly include reliance on material and concerns that are peculiar to sport.
The famous ruling in Bosman 3 fits this model. The Court considered that rules governing the transfer of players and rules requiring nationality-based discrimination in club football exerted effects on player mobility and contractual negotiation. They therefore fell within the scope of the Treaty. This did not mean they were unlawful: it meant only that they required justification. The Court accepted that 'the aims of maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be accepted as legitimate ' (para. 106) . While finding that the particular practices impugned in Bosman fell foul of the Treaty because they did not adequately contribute to these legitimate aims, the Court showed itself receptive to embrace of the special features of sport, even though these were not explicitly recognised by the abandoned, but rather adjusted by the industry itself; in particular sports bodies were able to retain rules designed to protect contractual stability against players wishing to move without club consent (Brand and Niemann 2007) . For some sports bodies, UEFA in particular, a strategy of co-operation with the EU has been chosen as the most promising way to promote awareness of sporting exceptionalism in the decisional practice of the EU's institutions (García 2007b (Parrish 2003a, Ch. 6) . It is within this political turn that the efforts of sporting bodies to achieve Treaty recognition for sport (with the ultimate goal of controlling the Court and Commission's interference) have to be understood.
Concern to introduce an explicit mention of sport in the Treaties dates back to the mid 1980s. The current president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Jacques
Rogge, who was at that time chairing the association of European Olympic
Committees (EOC), played a key role in raising sport's awareness of the value of such change. He also drove the first lobbying efforts aimed at national governments under the umbrella of both the EOC and the European Non-Governmental Sport Organisations (ENGSO): 'Some contacts were made during the Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) leading to the Maastricht Treaty, but the Member States did not contemplate sport as a priority at all. In any case this was just a first contact, because the real discussions did not really start until about 1992 or 1993'. 6 The argument of the sporting movement has been historically built around two concepts: the specificity of sport and the autonomy of sports federations as regulators within their discipline. To promote these ideas, an intensive lobbying strategy was designed, taking into account the multi-level nature of the EU, the resources of sport organisations in Brussels and, especially, their contacts at national level through national federations and National Olympic Committees. 7 The so-called sporting movement is perfectly equipped to engage with the EU machinery, for it presents an By the time of the Nice Treaty, the Convention and the Lisbon Treaty, the contacts between the sporting movement and EU institutions in relation to Treaty change were fluid. As Kingdon (1995: 128-129 ) points out, issues are more likely to be considered on political agendas after a period of 'softening-up'. Political leaders (especially from Germany and France) were persuaded to bring sport into the negotiations that led to both the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties. In the former case, it was 'probably too early for the case of sport', whilst in the latter 'political negotiations on institutional reform did not allow much time for other issues'. 8 blandly advised of a 'call for a specific legal basis for support for sport '. 11 In fact, sport was not a high-profile issue in the debates and even the few documents that referred to it were in the main confined to brief comment without elaboration. 12 Those contributions which displayed more ambition were grouped around a common anxiety that legal intervention undermines the special character of sport. They were consequently inclined to more legally durable protection than was provided by the (Parrish 2003b: 39) . These were on-record contributions for the benefit of all Convention members and, to some extent, they were a formal exercise. More importantly, from the very beginning of the Convention the sporting movement organised lobbying targeted at different levels:
We tackled this issue of the European Convention at quite an early stage.
We [the IOC and EOC office] enabled our partners to take action towards the [Convention] representatives of their countries, we prepared the papers, the arguments, we talked to all the different kind of representatives in the Convention. We had meetings with members of the Praesidium of the Convention, with the secretariat, with the Commission (…) 18 The importance of the working groups was recognised, but contacts were also built before and after Mr Christophersen's group reported back to the Convention: 'We followed the working groups and for us the response of Christophersen was actually not very positive, but nevertheless we succeeded in putting our message across on other fronts'. 19 Lobbying by sports organisations during the Convention combined high and low level meetings, as explained above, but towards the end it was the political weight of IOC President Jacques Rogge which pushed the Convention Praesidium to include sport:
We had meetings with members of the Praesidium of the Convention, for We faced opposition especially from the UK. The British team had reserves because they did not want to commit, even if it was informally, to any addition of new competences in the Treaty. They were very cautious (…) It was a difficult negotiation, but we managed to get the agreement, in principle, of the UK, which was almost a victory for all of us.
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With that agreement at a key moment in 2003, the sports ministers strengthened their political case, bringing the agendas together at the decisive moment of the Convention:
That Greek Presidency coincided with the works of the Convention. It was then when we [European sports ministers] intensified our political lobbying in the Convention, we had to convince as many people as posible. We submitted a declaration from Spanish and French Convention members in support of the inclusion of sport and tried our best, but the first draft did not incorporate sport. We had then to raise our level of lobbying at the highest level through the governments and thankfully with the collaboration of all of us the Praesidium finally accepted to incorporate sport into the Treaty. 22 The European Commission Sports Unit also worked in favour of an article on sport.
The political intervention of Commissioner Viviane Reding (then in charge of sport within her Education and Culture portfolio) influenced the Praesidium, especially through conversations with Michel Barnier and Antonio Vitorino, who were representing the Commission in the Praesidium. 23 The Commission not only provided an important last push, but (in close consultation with sports ministers) it was also behind the wording of the article:
Jaime Andréu [former Head of the European Commission Sports Unit] would say it is his article, it is the Commission's wording, which perhaps is true but not the whole truth (…) He put it in circulation, so the wording, if you put it to the wording, probably comes from the [European Commission] sports unit. But the will to implement this article was a common project to prepare the will of these decision makers, was a common project of the sports organisations, sports ministers and the Commission. 24 Thus, the Praesidium's decision to incorporate sport in the February 2003 draft Constitution was largely unopposed, and probably also unnoticed by most members of the Convention: 'Sport is an important issue for us of course, but we always benefit from the fact that, at the end of the day, it is relatively marginal in the wider scheme of EU politics, so people do not necessarily pay excessive attention'. 25 Indeed it was declared in May 2003 that the drafts of new legal bases, including that pertaining to sport, had 'in general been well received'. 26 Sport's inclusion as an area in which the EU should be explicitly empowered was by now insufficiently contentious to emerge as a sticking-point.
The efforts of the European sports ministers to convince their own governments and then other Convention members, together with the determination of the European Commission's sports unit, complemented the case presented by sports organisations.
There were certainly differences in the objectives of the several interested parties, as explained below, but they all shared a common objective to see sport recognised in The ambition was plainly that an explicit reference to sport should help to preserve sport's autonomy, rather than because of any belief that the EU should assume a more active regulatory role. This is a strategy of empowering the EU in order to restrain it.
However, the text agreed in 2003 was in this respect not satisfactory to some concerned to defend sport's interests. This is the second of two occasions in the progress of negotiation where those pressing the interests of sport were able to secure What is the 'specific nature of sport'? The notion was aired at the Convention. In November 2002 a contribution by Duhamel and Beres simply proposed that the Union be committed to recognise 'the specificity of the sport'. 27 The phrase also appears in a small number of other contributions but its intended impact is not elaborated. 28 In general 'specificity' is best understood as the 'next best' argument of sporting bodies after autonomy. Autonomy is a claim to immunity. Specificity is a claim to have the law moulded in application to meet sport's special concerns. However, the concept forward what could be considered the maximum ambition of the sporting movement.
It contained references to both the autonomy and specificity of sport:
We were lucky that the IGC was under Italian presidency because Mario Pescante's work was extremely important and influential. The Italian presidency presented a new wording for the article, different to the Convention's. He [Pescante] wanted to include all our [i.e. the sports ministers'] objectives, namely sports autonomy, specificity, education and anti-doping. 30 During that meeting in Florence the sports ministers first agreed to maintain the article on sport for the IGC and they then negotiated on the basis of Pescante's document:
We had to negotiate a lot because there was some opposition. We trimmed down the Italian proposal, but I would say we reached a general agreement. There was only opposition from the UK, Ireland and Denmark if I remember correctly. But it was more of a formal opposition. That was an informal meeting of sports ministers, so they were very cautious in not committing to anything formally. They said they had to report back. Yet, there was a general sense that we needed to recover that article on sport. I think it was also very important the agreement of the new Central and Eastern European Countries, who were already participating in our meetings.
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The opposition of the British, Irish and Danish governments to the principles agreed in Florence was overcome with a mixture of peer pressure from the other Member
States and high level lobbying by the IOC and the national Olympic Committees of the affected countries. The British case was quickly solved once the government realised it would be detrimental for the London 2012 bid to oppose the IOC. 32 There was still some way to go towards the final wording of the article on sport. First, the informal agreement of the sports ministers had to be revised by the legal service and ratified by the Member State representatives in the IGC (i.e. the foreign affairs ministers). More importantly, the Commission was unhappy with the agreement in Florence: 'That text was difficult to accept, it gave too much space to sports organisations, we could never allow that with the case law of the Court, which is very clear'. 33 Plainly the Commission has no veto and would have been powerless had there existed a political consensus in favour of sweeping aside the Court's interventionist case law. However, as had already been plain in the drafting of the Nice Declaration, there was no real appetite among national governments to pursue such radical modification of the Treaty, and accordingly the legal and political preferences of the Commission carried weight with the sports ministers and with the IGC's legal services. Negotiation during the final months of the IGC further adjusted the text agreed in Florence:
The Commission was unhappy with the text we agreed in Florence. We had to negotiate with them before the end of the IGC. We set up a negotiating party between the Member States and the Commission that started to modify and trim down the text. Little by little, meeting by meeting we went on trying to fine tune the article. In the end we got to a text that the Commission was happy with and that we [the sports ministers] also accepted. Yes, it is short, perhaps we could have said more about autonomy or specificity, but it covers the objectives of the sports ministers. forward by the sporting movement. It is a compromise in true EU style. It is also a story which reveals sport's lobbying expertise. The intensity of interaction described in this paper, conducted entirely unnoticed on the formal record of the Convention and the IGC, was skilfully guided through all available fora, most prominently the Convention but also the subsequent IGC, exploiting leverage over national governments and the Commission (in particular). Sports bodies deserve to be understood as part of the fabric of 'élite pluralism' which characterises EU interest politics (Mazey and Richardson 2006, Coen 2007) . In addition the shaping of the outcome confirms the highly influential role played by the EU Presidency, both generally (Niemann and Mak 2010) and in the particular context of negotiation over
Treaty revision (Beach 2005) . Sport enjoyed the crucial advantage of an 'insider'
within the IGC's Italian Presidency, Mario Pescante.
THE TREATY OF LISBON
The Treaty establishing a Constitution, mortally wounded by its rejection in referenda 
ASSESSMENT: A DECLARATION OF PEACE?
A Treaty which ignored sport completely was a Treaty which, in the hands of the Court and the Commission, controlled sporting autonomy with some vigour. Absent political consensus conducive to granting sport exemption from the Treaty, the 'next best' solution for those engaged in sports governance was to write sport into the Treaty in a way that would constrain the interventionist tendencies of the EU's institutions. This is the motivation that drove the adjustments made by the Lisbon Treaty.
However, the terms of the new provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to guarantee further disputes about the impact of EU law on sporting practices. This is no declaration of peace.
Article 165 It is significant that after the Lisbon Treaty reforms sporting bodies can no longer claim that sport is none of the EU's business. Instead one would expect them to claim that it is the EU's business but only to a limited extent, and only in so far as respect is shown for its 'specific nature'. The key to the Lisbon adjustments will be whether The problem from the perspective of sport is that these concessions to 'specificity' are made on the terms dictated by the decisions of the Court and the Commission. This anxiety had driven the Independent European Sport Review, published in 2006 (Arnaut 2006) and heavily influenced by UEFA, which deployed the discourse of 'specificity' in pressing for a wider exclusion from the Treaty than the case law of the Court admits (Miettinen 2006) . The 2007 White Paper largely ignores this plea.
Consequently it generated renewed criticism that the conditions imposed on sporting autonomy by EU law are inapt to take account of the particular features of sport and that in any event their case-by-case application breeds unpredictable disruption (Hill 2009 ). The fear for sports bodies is that the Lisbon reforms are simply more of the same.
After Lisbon the Treaty's explicit recognition of sport's 'specific nature' will doubtless provide the first line of defence. And it is at least possible that the Court and the Commission will be tempted to show a greater deference to sporting choices than they did prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Union action shall be aimed at 'developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.' This is a mix of the obscure and self-evident. 'Fairness' could be a glib notion which has no policy bite or it could convey a very specific commitment to competitive balance. Sports bodies might argue that practices which restrain competition should nonetheless be treated as compatible with the Treaty in so far as they achieve a better balanced distribution of wealth within a sport as a device to promote 'fairness'. This has particular resonance in the matter of sale of broadcasting rights, where sporting bodies have frequently though with mixed success argued that joint, rather than individual, selling should be treated as a justified means to raise income which can be spread in order to improve 'solidarity' in the game (Parrish & Miettinen 2009 , Weatherill 2010 . The problem for sports bodies is that the place where resolution of these finely balanced issues occurs is the place where it has always occurred: before the Commission or ultimately the The Olympic and Sports Movement must be a key player in defining which sporting rules shall be recognised as specific, and accordingly are to be governed uniquely by sports federations. The intention is not to obtain an exemption from EU law, but a specific application of EU law to sport.
This is a good deal more subtle than past pleas for a sporting exemption, commonly accompanied by aggressive disdain for the EU's pretensions. Moreover, as part of a strategy of ensuring participation and influence, it is proposed to extend existing cooperation between the Olympic and Sports Movement and the Commission to include also permanent consultation with the Parliament and the EU Sports Council.
A failed strategy of 'keep the EU out!', which would have been realised only by the total exemption of sport from the EU Treaty, has been replaced by a preference to work more co-operatively while seeking to use the EU's own Treaty, and most of all its reference to the 'specific nature' of sport, as a basis for confining its intrusion. This was the story behind the negotiations at the Convention and again at the IGC, and it is the blueprint for the future. It is, however, not clear whether the Lisbon Treaty, despite bringing sport explicitly within the Treaty for the first time, has changed the scope or character of the conditional autonomy from EU law that sport has long been forced to tolerate. One may therefore predict a re-affirmation of strategies of cooperation with the EU's institutions, because ultimately sporting bodies will have to win their battles to protect their preferred methods of operation at the same venues as before, in Luxembourg and in Brussels.
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